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Introduction
“Constraints set limits to what can be done but do not determine what has to 
be done”, wrote Ralf Dahrendorf more than twenty years ago.
This sentence still applies, and has perhaps become even more relevant, to the 
situation in which political Liberalism finds itself in Germany today. Dahrendorf 
headed his article The future tasks of Liberalism – a political agenda, and the 
present political discussion is also about nothing more or less than that.
The eminent Liberal sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf made this statement in a paper 
he presented to the Pisa Congress of Liberal International in September 1988; 
I came across it again by chance and was immediately struck once more by its 
rigour and the clarity of its content but also of its historical contextualisati-
on and farsightedness, to such an extent that I suggested the paper be made 
available to a wider audience.
The crux of the matter, and the task facing us now, is not to produce an instruc-
tion leaflet for everyday political life. In the cited paper, Ralf Dahrendorf put 
it very aptly when he wrote, “There not only are no simple answers but there 
should be no simple answers. Liberals must not feel self-conscious about this 
fact, and must never apologise for not offering patent medicines. Accepting 
complexity is at the very heart of liberal thinking”.
Politicians are confronted every day with constraints that demand a rapid re-
sponse and quick-acting measures. In an increasingly complex landscape of 
challenges and structural problems, however, this very art of the possible means 
that it is not the root of evils which is addressed but only whatever appears on 
the surface. The problem, which then seems at first sight to have been solved, 
re-emerges in the long run, thereby nurturing growing dissatisfaction and a 
loss of trust in the abilities of politicians in general. 
What is needed, therefore, is a form of political Liberalism that can shape a liberal 
civil society as well as brand management of the accompanying policy package, 
in this case the underlying philosophy of the Liberal political programme. What 
are people to think of us? How are they to see us? What are our aims? These 
are the questions we need to answer.
6Time and again, free societies are called upon to reassure themselves and to 
develop a keen awareness of the foundations of freedom and of threats to 
freedom.
Freedom in civil society comprises individual opportunities as well as social ties 
and obligations. Without social obligations, without the subjection of individual 
freedom to the freedom of others and to the context of a community, the idea 
of a free society evaporates. In the words of Ralf Dahrendorf, “Human beings 
are social beings. They cannot define themselves except in relation to others. 
They cannot pursue their purposes except in the company of others. They can-
not cultivate the world except with and for others”.
A liberal order cannot survive without a fortified line of defence. Not least 
among the foundations on which free societies are built are a number of con-
ditions which are, strictly speaking, contrary to human nature but which serve 
to provide for reasonably peaceful coexistence, wrote Joachim Fest – conditions 
such as voluntary renunciations, tolerance, respect for minorities and respect 
for the rights of weaker members of society and of foreigners. In fact, as Wolf-
gang Sofsky said, it is not in paternalism that a state finds the justification for 
its existence but only by guaranteeing those rights that are designed to pro-
tect individuals from abuses and their privacy from intrusion. The protection 
of individuals in a social environment in which they are effectively unable to 
exercise their rights is also a component of the rule of law, according to Carl 
Christian von Weizsäcker. There are traditional defensive rights which citizens 
possess and must retain. 
It is the people, and only the people, who empower the state in difficult situ-
ations to curtail rights to a reasonable extent for the sake of the security of 
everyone. As Joachim Fest wrote, “There are civilising treasuries of freedom and 
the rule of law that must never be abandoned”.
Free societies must develop a culture of dealing with differences and inequa-
lities if they aspire to justice for everyone. Justice needs a social yardstick. “It 
endangers the foundations of freedom if success is a source of envy and re-
sentment”, wrote Udo di Fabio. “Anyone who makes an effort and succeeds is 
entitled to respect.” In this context, John Rawls wrote that what a person is 
due or ought to be granted, for the sake of justice, is what he or she has achie-
ved under a fair set of rules without impairing the rights of others. For some 
considerable time now, I have been describing this culture and this necessity 
as ‘fairness’, and I regard fairness as an attitude to which political Liberalism 
should attach importance, for otherwise we shall remain in a situation por-
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trayed by Arthur Schopenhauer, who said that envy was the highest form of 
recognition in Germany. 
The redistribution margin of the welfare budget is often perceived as the 
main gauge of the morality of social policies. Maintaining the impression of 
justice so as not to alienate voters is the formula that underlies most present-
day political approaches to social redistribution. Particularly in the realm of 
social policy, the highest-bidder mentality is a frequent driving force. That 
is no way to measure social justice. The key must be the individual’s stake 
in society. 
Interplay between economic growth and civil rights in the form of entitle-
ments and options is feasible, and Dahrendorf sums this up aptly, saying that 
it is possible to have both a well-provided table and a place for everyone at it. 
Freedom, however, remains imperfect unless all citizens have a stake in their 
society through employment and a reformed welfare state. 
This leads on to an extremely important area in which political Liberalism must 
set out trail markers. Learning is the crucial sustainability factor in economic, 
cultural, social and political terms. To this end, however, it is not enough to 
increase education spending, nor does the answer lie in more teaching, a cen-
tralised final examination, new curricula or quality-assurance programmes. It 
is not a matter of sounding off loudly about innovations, as happens at many 
an education summit. It is about skills; it is about having the competence to 
manage and deal with changes and challenges. Building a good CV requires a 
complex combination of knowledge and ability, of character and attitude, of 
general education and key skills. 
We simply need a system in which it is worth striving hard in a limited number 
of disciplines, learning how to learn and practising vital life skills. This poses 
a challenge, especially for teachers and parental homes. It is about the way 
in which knowledge is imparted in schools. Teachers must stand up for what 
they teach and must also be able to explain the importance of course content, 
its ‘social relevance’, to quote Klaus Hurrelmann. 
There is no need for Liberalism to reinvent itself – as is apparent, for example, 
from the fact that we can still concur with writings such as the Dahrendorf 
article even after more than two decades of political discussion. It represents a 
significant part of the philosophical bedrock of Liberal policies.
8I am delighted and grateful that Lord Dahrendorf’s widow has enabled the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom to publish the 1988 article, and I 
recommend close and careful study of the report that follows.
Dr. Wolfgang Gerhardt, 
Chairman of the board of directors 
of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom
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A New Wave of the Politics of Liberty is Rising
This paper is an agenda for the politics of liberty. It offers principles and a sen-
se of direction rather than detailed policy proposals. This is not to say that the 
paper is an exercise in political philosophy. It is geared to the problems out of 
the belief in the primacy of individual liberty.
There are some signs of dogmatism and thoughtlessness. There are those who 
believe that they know all answers, and many others who find it hard to make 
sense of the present, and harder still to map the next steps into the future. Li-
berals abhor dogmatism and seek a thoughtful way forward. They also recognise 
that politics today operates under constraints which unilateral action cannot 
remove. A liberal political agenda must therefore begin with recognition of 
these constraints and then go on to priorities for action.
This paper is written by a European. It undoubtedly betrays the limitations of 
this cultural bias. However, the intention of this agenda is universal. The guiding 
idea knows no boundaries. The dignity of the individual is best safeguarded in 
civil societies, and the creation of civil societies everywhere must eventually 
lead to the construction of a world civil society. 
This paper shuns mere labels, but the agenda is intended to give substance to 
the new wave of a politics of liberty.
Economically, the interdependence of the world has never been more pro-
nounced. Prosperity everywhere depends on the maintenance of free trade and 
stable conditions of exchange. The competitiveness of national economies re-
quires often painful adjustments to international realities. 
Constraints set limits to what can be done but do not determine what has to be 
done. Moreover, they can be changed, and some of them need to be changed. 
But they cannot be ignored. Politics, whatever its partisan complexion, begins 
with the recognition of realities if it is not to be irrelevant and ineffective. Li-
beral politics, which is about changing the real world in order to advance the 
life chances of real people, certainly recognises the constraints of internatio-
nal politics and economics as its starting point. It therefore shares with those 
others who acknowledge the realities certain basic orientations:
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 Peace requires relations between the powers and their alliances which aim –
at negotiated disarmament, a plausible strategy of avoiding armed conflict, 
and the extension of relations between countries of different systems.
 Development requires joint efforts by those who seek to advance their eco-–
nomic, social and political fortunes and those who are in position to help.
 Survival requires concerted initiatives to safeguard the physical foundations –
of life on earth which include the protection and in part re-creation of a 
viable environment, the controlled exploitation of resources, and a match 
between population development and the potential for wealth.
 Prosperity requires an appreciation of the forces of the world economy which –
combines adjustment processes in order to achieve competitiveness with 
the search for stable rules, notably with respect to the monetary system.
 Progress requires that fundamentalist politics be held at bay and a world –
culture reasonable discourse be developed.
These orientations are not peculiarly liberal, but liberals are a part of a political 
universe which accepts them as preconditions of action.
Elementary Human Rights Are a Necessary 
Precondition of Liberty Everywhere
Even those who declare liberalism outdated usually admit that at least some 
of its tenets have become widely accepted and often constitutionally entren-
ched elements of modern societies. Indeed it has been argued by some that the 
success of liberal values has made liberal politics redundant. There is probably 
some truth in such statements, though scepticism is in place when the claim 
is made that “we are all liberals today”. History is not a one-way street. Some 
contemporary issues touch the raw nerves of liberty, and others raise time-ho-
noured liberal principles afresh. It would be wrong to discuss the future tasks 
of liberalism without restating these principles.
Liberalism has begun its historical path as the political philosophy of civil so-
ciety and the rights which are its first prerequisite. Individual human beings 
are inviolate, and it is the task of the political community to guarantee their 
integrity. This is a protective as well as an enabling task.
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Individuals have to be protected from physical and mental violence, from arbi-
trary arrest and torture as well as from more subtle controls. Individuals have 
to be enabled to speak their minds and take part in the process of determining 
their affairs. Moreover, all individuals without regard to their sex or race or 
creed have these basic entitlements. 
One needs but mention this fundamental tenet of liberalism to become aware 
of the fact that much needs to be done to make the principle real. Several vi-
olations of elementary human rights require special attention:
 In a frighteningly large number of countries people are arrested without –
trial, detained without recourse, maltreated and tortured. Human rights 
groups have emerged in these countries, but their agenda remains vast. It 
is a liberal agenda.
 In a small number of countries, constitutional and legal barriers prevent a –
majority from exercising its civil rights. Where such privilege – and conse-
quent discrimination – is built into the legal system, the very principles of 
free societies are challenged. The rules obtaining in sovereign countries are 
not easily changed from outside, but one can try. The rights of the oppressed 
must be safeguarded.
 In fact, though generally not in law, full civic participation is still denied to –
important groups even in the most civil societies. Entrenched social obstacles 
stand in the way of effective equal rights for women, and of racial, ethnic, 
religious minorities. Social movements have sprung up to advance these 
causes. They are liberal causes.
 Science and technology offer great opportunities, but they also involve new –
threats to individuals. These are partly threats to physical integrity and partly 
to human autonomy. Possibilities of manipulation have increased enormously 
since the age of totalitarianism and open up frightening prospects. The new 
risks of genetic engineering in particular require the attention of liberals.
The list is alas! very incomplete. Censorship, police powers, administrative ab-
uses, the denial of voting rights, freedom of information and many other issues 
have not even been mentioned. The “rights of man and the citizen” are not only 
never completely achieved but above all never achieved once and for all.
It has become a widely accepted practice to relate civil rights and social posi-
tion to each other. Poverty is described as a violation of human rights which is 
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no less abhorrent than arbitrary arrest. Liberals must beware of such confusion 
of language. Perhaps extreme poverty is as abhorrent as arbitrary arrest. It will 
be argued that poverty and unemployment are an unacceptable denial of citi-
zenship for some. But human rights are human rights and economic or social 
position is economic or social position. It is misleading to confuse the two or 
attempt to balance one by the other. There is no excuse for violations of civil 
rights. The liberal demand for elementary human rights is unconditional and 
non-negotiable.
Human rights are not a Western cultural prejudice either. The dignity of man 
knows no boundaries. Cultural differences impinge on many spheres of life; the 
right to be different is itself worth defending. Insistence on basic human rights 
however is universal. It is therefore the common cause of liberals everywhere.
Accepting Complexity and the Commitment  
to Internationalism are Defences Against  
a New Fundamentalism and All Forms of Protectionism
The constraints of the time listed above all tend to push people in one direc-
tion. They compel us to accept international links and responsibilities, and by 
the same token they force us to live with complexity. They are neither unila-
teral nor simple answers to major political and economical challenges. Politics 
today requires mature and self-confident action if it is to advance the cause of 
freedom. Many however are not prepared or not able to take such action. They 
try to escape the demands of a complex, interdependent world. Unilateralism 
and fundamentalism have become popular political philosophies from the na-
tionalist right to the left.
There is no shortage of examples. Again, only the most striking – and those 
most in need of countervailing action – can be mentioned:
 At a time of effective internationalisation of economic activity, economic –
nationalism is spreading. This can take many forms. Of course countries 
must be free to increase their competitiveness by positive economic, social 
and educational policies. But when they seek gains by creating barriers to 
the goods and services of others, or artificial advantages for their own, they 
violate rules of the game which are a necessary condition of prosperity for 
all.
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 The needs of developing countries are greater than ever. The combined –
effect of population growth, the debt burden, epidemic diseases, the frailty 
of indigenous elites, internal and external wars creates a nearly disastrous 
predicament. At the same time, a mood of withdrawal and benign neglect 
seems to spread in the OECD world. This is morally unacceptable. It is also 
likely to undermine the world order in the medium term. A new approach 
to development is high on any liberal agenda.
 Along with economic nationalism, the spread of what might be called –
social protectionism is a problem. In many countries, important groups 
have refused to continue attempts to live together with others who are 
different by creed or race. Demands for homogeneity have taken the place 
of civilised heterogeneity. Often, these demands give rise to violence. In any 
case, they are one instance of the apparent inability of many to cope with 
complexity.
 The debate about modernity is a part of the same trend. Among intellectuals –
it takes the form of a search for a “postmodernity” which is often anti-
modern, that is anti-individualist and anti-rational. Others turn a justified 
scepticism in view of the moral ambiguity of science and technology into 
absolute demands for the rejection of technology which would lead, if 
granted, to severe restrictions not only of prosperity but of people’s room 
for manoeuvre. The debate about nuclear energy offers examples, as does 
the dogmatism of “alternative life-styles”. The “politics of cultural despair” 
is en vogue again.
In the face of such trends, the politics of liberty requires the reassertion of two 
critical tenets. One is that the world is not simple. It never was; but the greater 
the potential of civilisation is, the more necessary it is to acknowledge com-
plexity. Let there be no misunderstanding: acknowledging complexity does not 
mean that we try to master a complex world by an equally intricate system of 
political organisation. On the contrary, it means that autonomous forces should 
be allowed to operate, constrained only by rules which are designed to protect 
individuals. Complexity means that we listen and watch as much as we try 
to organise and intervene. Very often the “market” society finds its own ways 
better than any planner could. What is needed is an old liberal attitude. There 
not only are no simple answers but there should be no simple answers. Liberals 
must not feel self-conscious about this fact, and must never apologise for not 
offering patent medicines. Accepting complexity is at the very heart of liberal 
thinking. In that sense, liberalism remains a distinctly modern view.
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Liberals are committed to internationalism. This means in the first instance 
an attitude of mind which informs political decisions. It means beyond that a 
commitment to the strengthening of hitherto rudimentary attempts to create 
international law. This in turn implies the acceptance of international organi-
sations. Some of the bodies created after the Second World War are in need of 
reform; but withdrawal from them, to say nothing of their abolition, is inappro-
priate. A world order respected by all countries remains an important objective 
even at a time at which the existing organisations are under pressure and in 
many cases need reform.
Varied and Diverse Provisions for Human 
Choice by Economic Growth and Political 
Pluralism Are a Condition for Liberty… 
The central issue on the agenda of liberalism is also the thread that links con-
temporary liberals with their origins in the great revolutions of the eighteenth 
century. It can be put in one question: How can we have economic growth and 
citizenship rights for all as well? The question has more general implications. 
How can we have a wide range of choices and effective opportunities of access 
to this range for every person? I shall call these choices, which involve a varie-
ty and a diversity not just of economic goods and services but also of cultural 
and poltical alternatives, provisions; and I shall call the entry tickets to these 
choices, the opportunities of access, entitlements. 
There is no necessary trade-off between the two. It is possible to have both a 
well-provided table, and a place for everyone at it. Eighteenth-century liberals 
fought for both, entitlements and provisions. They demanded, and achieved civil 
rights, beginning with equality before the law and the right of contract, and 
they created growing industrial economies as well as multi-party states. From 
Adam Smith through Wilhelm von Humboldt to John Stuart Mill, important aut-
hors have developed this agenda. In the nineteenth century, and to some extent 
to the present day, the two original objectives of liberalism fell apart. Liberals 
remained advocates of choice, of varied and diverse provisions, but many of 
them tended to support attempts to close the doors of access. Even the battle 
for universal suffrage was not always fought by liberal parties, let alone the 
struggle for adding social guarantees to the rights of citizenship. It could be 
argued that if liberals had remained the party of entitlements, socialism would 
never have gained ascendancy. Only American liberals – the Democratic Party 
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– have managed this feat; most others have succumbed to the lure of privilege 
for those who had made it and thus the exclusion of those who had not.
This weakness was based rather on interest than thought. Indeed, most thin-
kers did not share it. After all, John Maynard Keynes was a liberal. His notion 
of “effective demand” combines the creation of entitlements to participation 
in the market with a strong stimulus for economic growth. The same remedy 
may not be applicable today, but its history shows that there was no need to 
choose between entitlements and provisions. William Beveridge was a liberal. He 
designed a free society which guarantees every citizen a certain social position 
as of right. Again, the idea was that giving everyone access in this way would 
enhance rather than reduce choices. Again also, the problem today is different, 
though the trust of the answers of Keynes and Beveridge – the combination of 
changes in entitlements and provisions – defines like no other single idea the 
future tasks of liberalism.
Liberalism is nothing if not a political theory of innovation and change. Indi-
vidual life chances cannot be served by stagnation; they require the untiring 
exploration of ever-new opportunities. In the nineteenth century and beyond, 
those liberals who turned their newly gained position into one of privilege 
betrayed the entitlement element of liberalism. But more recently there have 
been those who thought that the consensus of all relevant groups within cor-
poratist arrangements was a liberal objective, and they betrayed the choice, 
or provisions element of liberalism. Corporatism strengthens bureaucracy and 
weakens liberty. Either way, closing doors and preventing new ideas or people 
from entering can never be a liberal objective.
The consequences which flow from this analysis for the tasks of liberalism are 
numerous. Economic growth is not an objective in itself, nor is every kind of 
growth acceptable. But encouraging innovation and growth including greater 
opportunities for individual earnings enhances life chances. In that sense, the 
economic and political measures described above as characteristic are liberal 
tasks. Choice moreover is not confined to the economy. In many countries the-
re are important debates about variety and diversity in education, and in the 
media. These are complex issues, but liberals should be found, in such debates, 
on the side of variety and diversity rather than regimentation.
This is also true with major respect to one of the main issues, the welfare state. 
However, before this issue is taken up, the argument has to be turned on his 
head. So what has been said so far about new problems is only one half of the 
story. Increasing provisions have created new issues of entitlement. Not all have 
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benefited from the choices which have been opened up; indeed, some have been 
pushed to the margin and beyond. 
Times of choice have also been times of a growing precariousness of citizenship. 
New barriers to access to the opportunities of society have been erected, and 
unless liberals tackle them with the same fervour as the miseries of stagflation, 
they fail to accomplish their task.
… But Liberty Remains Incomplete Without 
Entitlements of Citizenship for All By Full 
Employment and a Reformed Social State.
Theorists of a new entrepreneurship believe that by growth all other problems 
can be resolved. Many still think that economic development will in due course 
reduce and even remove unemployment and poverty. They apply, as it were, a 
“trickle-down theory” to OECD countries. But the signs are that they are wrong. 
Just as in the developing world, wealth did not trickle down beyond certain 
barriers of access, but remained a privilege, so the new prosperity of the OECD 
world leaves some out altogether. Unemployment turns into long-term unem-
ployment, poverty into hard-core poverty. The difference is that in developing 
countries a minority is privileged and the majority remains excluded, whereas 
in the OECD countries the majority can hope to benefit from a new flowering 
of provisions. Those who remain outside are a minority of, say, ten per cent, 
perhaps fewer in some though rather more in other countries.
The problem is nonetheless serious for that. A society which allows the persi-
stence of an underclass of systematically disadvantaged people not only betrays 
the principle of citizenship for all but creates a group which has no stake in 
its values. The resulting challenge to institutions is made more serious still by 
the growth of a “grey area” between those who are in and those who are out. 
Special problems arise for young people who in such a world see no future for 
themselves and turn to drugs, crime or mere withdrawal instead.
In policy terms this means that there are new entitlement problems which have 
to be resolved as such. They require action which does not follow automatically 
from economic growth and more varied positions. Social and political measures 
are needed which the majority may regard as painful, because they involve the 
redistribution of privilege. The objective is the reassertion of citizenship rights 
for all. Differences, including inequalities, of social and economic position are 
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acceptable – in fact they are often sources of innovation and progress – as long 
as access to full economic, social and political participation is universal; but 
new barriers to access require new policies of citizenship.
In other words, income differentials, differences in educational attainment and 
even in political authority are bearable if and when there is a common floor 
for all men and women to stand on. This common starting point is once again 
at risk.
Two main areas of action stand in the forefront. One is work and employment, 
the other is the welfare state. The two are related and may ultimately require 
one set of policies. In theory, the European problem of unemployment could be 
resolved by the downward flexibility of real incomes (declining real wages and 
lower non-wage labour cost), but if this path was chosen, it would have the 
(American) effect of creating jobs but paying the price of growing and incre-
asingly impenetrable poverty. Accepting social as well as economic conditions 
as given, the issues of employment and social policy can therefore be treated 
separately.
Employment and unemployment reveal a paradox. For a century, if not more, 
much organized effort was put into reducing the burden of work. Not having to 
work was the dream of generations which envied the privileges of the “leisure 
class”. All of a sudden, people’s aspirations seem to have been reversed. “Work-
aholics” populate the top of social hierarchies, whereas the less fortunate find 
themselves unemployed or in precarious employment. We should not forget this 
paradox, or the knowledge that employment is not a purpose in itself. However, 
it remains a fact that people’s livelihood, self-respect and organisation of life 
depend to a considerable extent directly or indirectly on employment. For this 
reason, if for no other, unemployment is unacceptable. It is a question of access 
to social participation that there are opportunities of employment for all. Their 
creation for those who are now excluded requires a complex set of measures:
 While flexibility of real incomes merely shifts the problem from unemplo-–
yment to poverty, there are elements of labour market flexibility which 
offer new employment opportunities. New forms of contract correspond 
to people’s wishes as well as the needs of enterprises and organisations. 
Mobility, especially within firms or organisations, can make redundancy 
unnecessary. (…)
 There is a need for re-distributing work itself. It would be wrong to imply –
that there is a fixed quantity of work which can be distributed in different 
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ways, but even if one takes into account the dynamics of job creation, there 
is a risk that those who have work will monopolise additional opportunities 
and those who have no work will be left behind. This is not acceptable. Apart 
from the limited possibilities of job-sharing, this means that those who 
have work will have to relinquish some of it in favour of those who do not 
have work. There is one major method to achieve this end: in future an even 
larger part of productivity increases has to be translated into (“free”) time 
rather than money. Shorter working hours provide new employment only if 
they release resources for it. Since organised labour guards the privileges 
of the employed, and employers are afraid to take on more labour, this is a 
demand with high social cost, but it is nonetheless important.
 The most vicious and consequential form of unemployment is youth unem-–
ployment. Experience shows that a combination of vocational training and 
apprenticeships is the only effective general remedy. The high cost of such 
a system is well spent.
 Normal measures of employment and social policy do not reach the hard –
core of unemployed. They require approaches which are geared to their often 
complex condition in which personal misfortune and social disadvantage 
are inextricably intertwined. The objective must be to reconnect people as 
citizens to the values and opportunities of the world around them. The most 
effective reconnection is brought about by training and education, though 
this has to be directed to the peculiar problems of those concerned.
 One of the apparent puzzles of high-unemployment countries is that so –
much remains undone while ten or fifteen per cent appear to have nothing 
to do. The measures recommended here may make some difference, but it 
will probably be necessary also to offer generous opportunities for social 
service. Such programmes need not, and perhaps should not be compulsory; 
their content can range from environmental improvements through care 
for the needy to Third World assistance.
Even full employment in tomorrow’s world will mean that people have much 
“free” time. Employment starts late, includes long periods of vacation, does not 
fill the week or even the day, and ends in early retirement. One of the major 
tasks of a policy of entitlements, and of choices, is to prepare people for a new 
combination of activities. This is a challenge to education. Clearly, skills are 
needed for people to make their way in the world of employment. Moreover, a 
general core of knowledge and the motivation to learn are a condition of fle-
xibility in a changing world. But education is also needed to enable people to 
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make sense of the time gained by the reduction of work, in periods of leisure, in 
the “third age” of retirement. Education has become the master key to work, to 
the wider activities of life, and to the maintenance of a culture of shared values. 
Re-thinking its content as well as its institutions is therefore urgent.
Today, the time has come to restate the purpose, and the implications, of so-
cial policy. The purpose remains to enable every citizen to take part fully in the 
opportunities offered by society. It is, in other words, a general, even universal 
purpose. All attempts to reduce social policy to a new form of poor law, to tar-
geted measures for stigmatised groups, are unacceptable. The implications of 
a social policy of citizenship however are not that existing arrangements can 
remain unchanged. Rethinking the welfare state in the light of the objective to 
advance individual life chances leads to a number of reforms.
 From a certain point onwards, the simultaneous increase of direct incomes –
made nonsense of the welfare state. Put positively, higher incomes justify 
greater individual contributions to social provisions. Every country seems to 
have its “sacred cow” in terms of public provisions; in one country, it is the 
educational system, in another, the health system, in a third, social security 
for the old. It would be wrong therefore to make specific recommendations 
applicable to all. But everywhere, greater individual contributions are indi-
cated. They may take the form of subsidised insurance or of purely private 
contributions, but they should lead to a ceiling on public expenditure in 
important areas.
 The welfare state has led to the emergence of vast bureaucracies. These –
are costly, they deter clients, and they constitute impersonal responses 
to highly personal needs. Three directions of change are indicated. One is 
the simplification of procedures. Standard entitlements are preferable to 
bureaucratic judgement, with all the fact-gathering and means-testing 
which it involves. The second is decentralisation. Responsibilities have to 
be devolved to be truly effective. The third direction of change is greater 
participation of small social groups – not just families – in the provision 
of services, notably in areas of care which transcend the capacity of public 
agencies.
 Most countries have developed systems of public assistance or social secu-–
rity which define a minimum level under which no one is allowed to fall. 
Frequently, however, this system is complicated by transfer payments from a 
variety of sources for a variety of purposes, such as child allowances, housing 
subsidies, sick pay etc. In the light of the intention to define a general level 
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of entitlements associated with citizenship, there is a strong case for ex-
amining methods of providing basic income guarantees, notably of a kind 
which can be linked to the tax system (“negative income tax”). If practical 
difficulties and reasonable objections to the system could be overcome, a 
basic income guarantee would clearly come closest to the principles of a 
liberal social state. 
This section of the agenda for liberalism is informed by one overriding princi-
ple. There are those (some of them in Liberal and many of them in Conserva-
tive parties) who believe that the extension of provisions, notably by economic 
growth, should have priority, because it is a necessary, and perhaps even suf-
ficient condition of solving all other problems. There are those (again some in 
Liberal, though more in Social Democratic Parties) who insist that entitlement 
issues must come first, because only people whose citizenship rights are safe-
guarded can sustain a prosperous modern society. Both have some arguments 
and evidence on their side, but in practice both pay the price of neglecting 
the legitimate concern of the other. If a political agenda can be defined which 
achieves, by related policies, increased choices and more access at one and the 
same time, it will serve the cause of liberty better than any other.
Common Citizenship and Cultural
Difference Can Exist Together
Citizenship has so far been treated as an issue of stratification, that is, of privi-
lege and deprivation. However, the original legal meaning of the term has to do 
with membership, that is with the question of who belongs and therefore enjoys 
the blessings of a country, and who does not. In recounting the secular maxims 
of liberalism the point has already been made that citizenship in this sense is 
far from general. In all societies, important groups are still fighting for full civic 
participation. New issues have arisen as a result of world-wide mobility.
Refugees and migrants seek a haven in more fortunate countries, but more of-
ten than not they remain human beings without citizenship. In the absence of 
a world civil society, those who are stateless are in important respects rightless 
too. After the First World War, the “Nansen passport” was invented to give such 
people elementary rights of mobility. Since then, further rights of the homeless 
have been defined by international conventions and by the practice of countries. 
A new initiative to codify such rights might well be helpful.
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Far and away the most important issue of citizenship is however the apparent 
inability of people of different race or creed or ethnic origin to live together. 
Heterogeneity has always been difficult for people to accept; but today the 
nearly ubiquitous fact has become explosive. Examples of the successful com-
bination of common citizenship and cultural difference are rare. Instead, we 
find the violent pursuit of territorial claims which gives rise to terrorism and in 
some cases to civil war. The challenge to liberals is evident, and it requires the 
re-statement of principles.
 The suspension of civil rights in order to uphold the domination of one section –
of the population over another is never acceptable. Where heterogeneity 
leads to violence, liberal sensitivities are challenged to insist on basic rights 
for all.
 Difference enriches the world. Within civil societies it can be made fruitful –
for all. On a world scale, the acceptance of common rights and opportunities 
for people of different cultures is the only hope of peace in freedom. The 
principle is no less applicable within societies. Full citizenship rights never 
rule out cultural autonomy. Indeed cultural diversity within a society of free 
citizens is a liberal ideal.
 Thus the fight for civil, political and social rights has precedence over the –
fight for territorial autonomy. The self-determination of people must not 
be allowed to override citizenship rights. There may be cases where the 
partition of countries or regions has become inevitable, but by itself this 
does not solve the issues of liberty.
This is not to make a case for traditional forms of intervention. It is on the 
contrary one for breaking the cycle of violence which is so often associated 
with the question of where people should belong. Asserting liberal principles in 
the face of civil wars may seem hopeless at first sight, but it is the only key to 
long-term solutions. Many free societies will be multiracial, multiethnic, mul-
ticultural societies. This is as it should be. It requires a complex combination of 
effective civil rights for all and opportunities for expressing difference. Good 
societies are not homogenous societies, but civil societies, and heterogeneity 
is their strength.
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Constitutional Liberals Look for a World Civil Society
Throughout their history, Liberals have shown a strong constitutional interest. 
Their concern was with the framework within which freedom can flourish, the 
constitution of liberty. The Act of Settlement and the Bill of Rights, the Declara-
tion of Independence and the American Constitution, as well as the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, are documents cherished by liberals. From 
John Locke to the contemporary “constitutional economists”, the rules of the 
game have been a major preoccupation of liberal political theorists. (This is an 
important difference between liberals and socialists: liberals are often primarily 
concerned with constitutional matters, socialists are always primarily concer-
ned with policy. Conservatives on the other hand are split in this respect.) The 
future tasks of liberalism inevitably involve a constitutional element.
This is in part a matter of the fundamental rules which provide safeguards 
against tyranny. Such rules are as important today in the developing world as 
in already developed countries. Newly industrialising countries in particular are 
groping with mixed success for constitutions which promise change without 
revolution. As a minimum, such constitutions should establish the rule of law 
and create political institutions which allow the removal of incumbents from 
office. A constitutional task force to advise those who seek appropriate ways 
forward would be a useful contribution which those with experience in the 
field can make.
In the developed world, two main issues of a constitutional nature require at-
tention. One has to do with the role of the state. Several trends in recent de-
cades, including the development of the welfare state, have led to significant 
increases in government activity. “Big government” was of necessity, also bu-
reaucratic government. Thus the executive gained in size and power, often at 
the expense of parliament, and always at the expense of citizens. Liberal minds, 
from Max Weber onwards, have described the bureaucratic and the corporate 
state as a nightmare. Indeed two counter-trends are unmistakable. One tries 
to wrest powers from the state in the name of democratisation. Insistence on 
direct participation of citizens, often coupled with the organisation of social 
movements (“citizens’ initiatives”) is used to reduce state power. At the other 
end, as it were, several theorists have advocated the reduction of state func-
tions to the bare essentials (“minimal state”), and some political leaders have 
actually begun to reduce public expenditure (most have merely stopped its in-
crease), to abstain from state interference in economic and social processes, 
stabilise and even cut the public service.
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For individual liberty, these are developments of great significance.
Clearly, “big government” supported by inescapable bureaucracies and stifling 
corporatist arrangements with major organisations is contrary to the constitu-
tions of liberty. At the same time, the minimal state, confined to the protection 
of law and order and very little else, would conflict with the tasks of liberalism 
in regard to both provisions and entitlements. (It is also a very unlikely pro-
spect, a theoretical model rather than a political objective.) The need is for an 
enabling state which is open to the input of citizens and social movements and 
encourages individuals as well as enterprises and groupings to do their own 
thing, but which accepts all the tasks which arise from the need to guarantee 
full citizenship rights for all.
The other constitutional issue in the developed world is if anything more dif-
ficult to tackle. It has to do with democracy. Democracy is the political system 
which corresponds to the condition of uncertainty in which we live. No one 
can know all answers; it is there for necessary to explore ever-new possibilities. 
This means that some must be put in a position to try their theory, but if they 
err, or are thought to err, it must be possible to remove them. Elected govern-
ments and parliaments have served these purposes well as long as there was a 
socially based political conflict between those whose interest was in preserving 
the status quo and those who wanted change. The interplay of government and 
opposition was a part of the democratic process, and it was founded in social 
groupings. The constitution of liberty worked because it gave an expression to 
what has been called the “democratic class struggle”.
Today, the old class struggle is more. A large majority of people in the OECD world 
can hope to realise their aspirations within the existing order. New problems, 
like those of the environment, affect all. Little more than nuances separate the 
main parties. In any case it is no longer so easy to define government and oppo-
sition, let alone their social foundations. Coupled with corporatism and bureau-
cratisation, this development raises questions about the role of parliament, the 
conditions of innovation, and the possibilities of control, to which there are no 
easy answers. Some constitutions, like that of the United States, may be better 
adapted to the new condition than others. Generally, however, there remains 
a constitutional desideratum to which liberals must address themselves: what 
constitutional arrangements can safeguard political change and popular control 
once the familiar interplay of government and opposition has given way to the 
heavy hand of bureaucracy on behalf of the silent majority?
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In the developing world, a different set of issues of a constitutional nature re-
quires attention. It has to do with civil society. Creating civil societies may well 
be the most important single liberal task of development. On the one hand, 
this requires the entrenchment of basic rights. On the other hand, civil socie-
ty is most clearly expressed by the growth of intermediate institutions which 
protect the individual from direct control by the state, and offer opportunities 
for expressing varied interests, views and aspirations. Encouragement to build 
such intermediate institutions can come from within developing countries and 
from without.
Ultimately, constitutional liberals everywhere will look for a world civil socie-
ty. They will favour the development of international law and institutions not 
merely as an expression of factual interdependence, but as a framework for 
national action. Support for rules and systems of sanctions on the international 
plane – the UN Committee on Human Rights, the International Court of Justice, 
the European Convention etc. – is therefore a liberal objective.
Institution Building Has Become a Liberal Task
In some respect the future tasks of liberalism are like those of the past. Defen-
ce of the rights of man and the citizen is a persistent liberal theme. In other 
respect new problems require new solutions in the light of accepted principles. 
Past descriptions do not help much when it comes to fighting long-term un-
employment. So far as the underlying vision of society is concerned, however, 
the objective has not changed, though the needs of tomorrow differ signifi-
cantly from those of yesterday. History never stands still. What is necessary in 
order to advance individual life chances in a civil society at one time, may be 
wrong at another.
For decades, liberalism was for many synonymous with emancipation. It still is, 
and in some ways it will be forever; after all, the Latin word emancipatio de-
scribes the release of individuals from external (actually: paternal) power, thus 
a form of liberation. Emancipation from traditional dependence, from depri-
vation and discrimination, from arbitrary power, remains a passionate concern 
of liberals everywhere. None of the following considerations can detract from 
this purpose.
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The experience of Europe and North America suggests however that the pro-
cess of emancipation can reach a point at which the normative foundations of 
society are put in question. If and when this happens, the reliability of social 
relations suffers along with the cohesion of groups and people, and individuals 
find it increasingly difficult to attach meaning to their lives.
Human beings are social beings. They cannot define themselves except in re-
lation to others. They cannot pursue their purposes except in the company of 
others. They cannot cultivate the world except with and for others. A social 
contract is needed which establishes norms and threatens transgressors with 
sanctions. We need institutions to advance liberty.
This is not new, but it is worth restating after a period (i.e. in the 60s and 70s) 
in which the dismantling of institutions was the effect of an increasingly wi-
despread public mood which many have associated with liberalism. Liberals are 
sensitive to the thoughtless and mechanical use of concepts like law and order. 
Police and prisons are no substitute for self-discipline and accepted norms. But 
the process of “liberalising” criminal law and criminal justice has at times led to 
the abandonment of any notion of individual responsibility in favour of social 
causation, and as a result to an unwillingness to enforce norms which are a 
necessary basis of civilised existence. A notion of civil society has become fa-
shionable which sets it against the state, its monopoly of violence, and its task 
to guard the normative rules of the game. Against this trend, it is important to 
reassert a concept of civil society which includes the law and the organisation 
of its enforcement.  
Other institutions have suffered. The family, local communities, religious grou-
pings, even customs of celebrating festive occasions and codes of behaviour, are 
examples. It is unlikely, and possibly undesirable, that they should be reconsti-
tuted in their old forms. But the incipient state of anomy, of normlessness, in 
some advanced countries is not bearable for long. It leads to disorientation, 
insecurity and vacuousness as well as situational violence and crime and drugs. 
Indeed many of the worrying mechanisms of escape from the alleged modern 
world, including the false ecstasies of drugs and television preachers, are re-
sponses to anomic social conditions. Institution-building has therefore become 
a major task of the time.
How does one build institutions? The term is misleading, for it suggests the 
conscious activity of construction. In fact, institution-building is a process 
which goes on all the time. In the interstices of bureaucracy, people have be-
gun to look after others, and after their own interests in quite effective ways. 
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Social policy in particular could not work without such initiatives. With regard 
to them, state interference is threatening rather than helpful. But there is need 
for some activity by those who have responsibility. Institution-building often 
means giving reasons why laws and organisations should be there at all. People 
have to understand them in order to accept them. Here is one of several moral 
tasks of political action.
It is clear then that institutions are more than laws. It could be argued that the 
plethora of laws enacted by our parliaments has itself contributed to institutional 
disorientation. Institutions are norms anchored in people’s minds and above all, 
in their everyday behaviour. They are accepted norms for which reasons can be 
given and which are observed as well as protected by sanctions and sanctioning 
instances. Institutions in this sense are the very core of civilisation.
Do we really want political parties involved in this process? The answer is yes, 
if they know their limits. After all, politicians are highly visible, representative 
figures. They can set the tone of their societies, and their attitude to institutions 
is very much a part of setting the tone.
Beyond that, there are practical ways of dealing with norms and sanctions. 
Between mechanistic observance and fearful disdain there is a confident, non-
hysterical, but regular and reliable application of the law and its penalties which 
could itself be described as institution-building. Great judges are justly praised 
for setting an example. Moreover, governments can pursue policies which leave 
space for autonomous and spontaneous institution-building. Constitutionally, 
this is the most important aspect of the reform of the welfare state. It requires 
self-denying reticence on the part of ministers who were brought up in the 
tradition that government can and should do everything.
The vision of society emerging from the agenda of this paper is not a utopia, 
because it is not a static system. There is no state of affairs in which liberalism 
has been completely realised. Liberalism is forever process, the process by which 
human beings explore new opportunities for more people. Every now and again, 
this process requires a new impetus to give it new momentum. Liberalism has 
always been a set of ideas which transcended the confines of particular parties. 
This agenda was not conceived as the programme of any particular party. More 
than that, it is understood that some parties which are called Liberal will not 
accept some parts of the agenda, whereas others with quite different names 
will discover their intentions in it. There is never a perfect match of ideas and 
organisations. But the ideas suggested in this paper may provide one answer 
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to both the thoughtless pragmatism and the new dogmatism of the time. The 
objective is individual life chances, and the method is civil society.
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